

you have asked. A similar letter is being sent to Chairman Goodlatte.

Sincerely,

MIKE JOHANNIS,  
*Secretary.*

# BREAST CANCER RESEARCH STAMP REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to thank very much all of my colleagues for their support in extending the Breast Cancer Research Stamp for another 2 years.

This bill has the strong bipartisan support of Senator HUTCHISON and 68 other Senators from both sides of the aisle.

Without congressional action, this extraordinary stamp is set to expire on December 31 of this year.

During the past 7 years, the U.S. Postal Service has sold over 650 million semipostal breast cancer stamps—raising \$47.4 million for breast cancer research.

These dollars allow the National Institutes of Health, NIH, and the Department of Defense, DOD, to conduct new and innovative breast cancer research.

So far the NIH has received approximately \$31 million and the DOD about \$13 million for breast cancer research—helping more people become cancer survivors rather than cancer victims.

In addition to raising much needed funds, this wonderful stamp has also focused public awareness on this devastating disease and provided hope to breast cancer survivors to help find a cure.

The breast cancer research stamp is the first stamp of its kind dedicated to raising funds for a special cause and remains just as necessary today as ever. For example: breast cancer is considered the most commonly diagnosed cancer among women in every major ethnic group in this country; over 2 million women in the U.S. are living with breast cancer, 1 million of whom have yet to be diagnosed; this year, approximately 211,240 women in this country will get breast cancer and about 40,410 women will die from this dreadful disease; and about 1,300 men in America are diagnosed with breast cancer each year though much less common.

Extending the life of this remarkable stamp is crucial so that we can continue to reach out to our women and men who do not know of their cancer and to those who are living with it.

This bill would permit the sale of the breast cancer research stamp for 2 more years—until December 31, 2007.

The stamp would continue to have a surcharge of up to 25 percent above the value of a first-class stamp.

Surplus revenues would continue to go to breast cancer research programs at the National Institutes of Health, 70 percent of proceeds, and the Department of Defense, 30 percent of proceeds.

This bill does not affect any other semipostal proposals under consideration by the Postal Service.

With this stamp every dollar we continue to raise will help save lives until a cure is found.

Again, I thank my colleagues for supporting this important legislation to extend the breast cancer research stamp for 2 more years.

## THE 2005 BRAC PROCESS

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the Base Realignment and Closure, or BRAC, process that occurred this year. I have always voted to authorize base closure rounds in deference to the Department of Defense's stated need to restructure our military facilities to meet current and future needs. Nevertheless, the ceding of significant authority by Congress to an independent commission is an extraordinary step that should not be undertaken frequently or lightly. When Congress does lend its power to an independent commission, we retain the responsibility to closely monitor the commission's deliberations and actions. I have done so with respect to the 2005 BRAC Commission, naturally paying the closest attention to the issues before the Commission that affect Iowans.

My observation of the Commission's final deliberations raised some concerns about the information and reasoning used in making its decisions. I followed up with a letter to the Commission to clarify these concerns and have recently received a response that did nothing to allay my concerns. As a result, I have now concluded that I do not have full confidence that this was a thorough and fair process.

A joint resolution to disapprove the 2005 BRAC recommendations has been introduced in the House and has just been marked up by the House Armed Services Committee. It will now be considered under expedited procedures. I would urge my colleagues in the House to approve this resolution. Obviously, if this resolution is not approved by the House, Senate action will be meaningless. But, if the Senate does take up such a resolution, I will vote to disapprove the 2005 BRAC recommendations.

The BRAC Commission is charged with reviewing the recommendations of the Department of Defense and altering those recommendations if they are found to deviate substantially from the BRAC criteria. On that basis, the Quad Cities community in Iowa and Illinois challenged some recommendations for the Rock Island Arsenal and did not challenge others.

One issue on which I thought we had a clear-cut case of a substantial deviation of the BRAC criteria was the proposed move of the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, or TACOM, organization at the Rock Island Arsenal to the Detroit Arsenal. This proposal was essentially a footnote to a consolidation of what is called inventory control point functions from 11 separate organizations

around the country that would now report to the Defense Logistics Agency. The consolidation of inventory control point functions would affect 52 people at TACOM Rock Island and was not challenged by the community. However, the DOD recommendation then, puzzlingly, proposed to move the rest of the approximately 1,000 employees of TACOM Rock Island to the TACOM Headquarters at the Detroit Arsenal in Michigan.

The facilities at the Detroit Arsenal are already strained to capacity. The base is encroached on all sides and has no room to grow. In fact, the Detroit Arsenal is rated far lower in military value than the Rock Island Arsenal. Moving in 1,000 new employees will require major military construction. That includes building two parking garages to replace the already limited parking space that would be used up. What's more, because of higher locality pay in the area, it will cost significantly more in the long term to pay those employees at the new location. You also lose some unique facilities currently used by TACOM Rock Island, like a machine shop and live fire range. In addition, there will be no space to house the outside contractors currently embedded with TACOM Rock Island, who would also need to move but aren't counted in the BRAC data.

The Quad Cities community challenged this proposed move on the basis of military value, and the enormous costs both up front and in the long run. In fact, the move would cost the taxpayers millions of dollars more out into the future. This point was made clear when Commissioner Skinner visited the Rock Island Arsenal. It featured prominently in my testimony before three BRAC Commissioners at the regional hearing in St. Louis. My colleagues, Senators DURBIN, OBAMA, and HARKIN and Representative EVANS also made this point at the regional hearing. This was followed by a detailed presentation by community representatives. Members of our bistate congressional delegation reinforced this point in follow-up phone calls to commissioners. Finally, community representatives and congressional staff met with the BRAC Commission staff to make sure they knew about the costs.

When it came time for the final deliberations, the Commission considered the TACOM move with the consolidation of inventory control point functions. I question this approach to start with since the TACOM move was completely unrelated to the other moves in the recommendation. It was obvious by Commissioner Skinner's questions to the BRAC staff that considering these unrelated moves in one recommendation confused the commissioners. Commissioner Skinner asked twice how the move being considered would affect another move from the Rock Island Arsenal to the Detroit Arsenal that he believed would be considered separately. He had to be corrected twice by staff who explained that it was all part of one recommendation.

Furthermore, despite all the briefings from the community, the BRAC staff presented a summary of the community's concerns that omitted the critical issue of the long-term costs of the move. The summary's only reference to cost was a relatively minor concern that the number of positions to move were underestimated. When Commissioner Skinner asked how increased estimates of the military construction costs at the Detroit Arsenal would affect the payback, the BRAC staff responded that "Payback with the new scenario, new MILCON, is \$1.8 billion savings over 20 years, still a large savings." However, that figure refers to the entire recommendation package, not just the otherwise unrelated TACOM move. I believe that response by the BRAC staff was intellectually dishonest and misleading.

The disturbing fact is that the TACOM move will actually squander \$128.23 in taxpayer money. I pointed out this problem in a message delivered to Commissioner Skinner before the Commission's final vote on the BRAC report, but no action was taken. Only after the final vote has the Commission admitted to me in a letter that the TACOM move, taken by itself, would cost \$128.23 million over the 20 year time frame used in their estimate. The Commission's letter also confirmed that the Commissioners were never briefed about the cost of the TACOM move by itself.

In its response to me, the BRAC Commission continued to justify considering the cost of the TACOM move in terms of the net present value of the entire recommendation. However, in reference to another portion of the same recommendation regarding a cryptological unit at Lackland Air Force Base, the slide used by the BRAC staff for its presentation read, "The extent and timing of potential costs outweigh potential savings with no payback of investment." The same could have been said about the TACOM portion of the recommendation. The Commission then voted to overturn the portion of the recommendation to realign Lackland Air Force Base. In this case, the Commission did consider one portion of the larger recommendation separately, including a staff analysis of the payback for just that portion of the recommendation, and voted to overturn that component of the larger recommendation. The Commission's justification for its failure to do so with respect to the TACOM portion of that recommendation therefore falls flat.

In fact, there is evidence that the selective presentation of facts by the BRAC staff resulted in Commissioners misunderstanding the issue when voting. In justifying his decision on the TACOM move in an interview with the Rock Island Argus, Commissioner Skinner said of the BRAC staff's analysis, "They said there's still significant payback by doing that and that was the major objection that they (the community) had." Commissioner Skinner

should have known the most about this proposed move from his site visits to both the Rock Island Arsenal and the Detroit Arsenal, but his statement is inaccurate. It seems clear from this quote that he was misled by relying on the faulty presentation by the BRAC staff.

Of course, while cost is a major consideration in BRAC, it is not the only consideration. Still, if a recommendation contains significant costs, like the TACOM move, there must be a very compelling case for an increase in military value to justify the costs. In this case, I think it is clear that more is lost in terms of military value than is gained. Moreover, the Commission never got to this point since the BRAC staff represented that the move was justified based on cost.

I don't believe that DOD made this recommendation based on a conclusion that consolidating TACOM in one location would increase military value in the first place. Several smaller components of TACOM in other locations were not proposed for consolidation. Still, if there was a compelling case for merging the two TACOM organizations together, then why wasn't the Rock Island Arsenal considered as a receiving site? The Rock Island Arsenal could accommodate all the personnel at Detroit Arsenal without major military construction, possibly even allowing Detroit Arsenal to be closed entirely. The Rock Island Arsenal was never considered as a receiving installation by DOD since it was assumed to be closing during much of DOD's internal BRAC process.

In fact, the preliminary assumption that the Rock Island Arsenal would close is why it was not considered as a receiving site for the consolidation of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Installation Management Agency, and Civilian Personnel Operations Center. In the case of the Civilian Personnel Operations Center, the BRAC staffer who presented this issue to the Commission pointed out that this was not fair and equal treatment, which is a violation of the BRAC rules. The Commission then voted to overturn the recommendation based on the fairness issue. I asked the BRAC Commission to answer why this same logic did not apply to their actions in each of these areas. The response stated that each recommendation was developed and briefed separately by DOD supporting different initiatives. This does not answer my question as to why the Commission did not overturn each of these recommendations on the basis of fairness as they did, rightly, with the Civilian Personnel Operations Center.

For instance, like the Civilian Personnel Operations Center at the Rock Island Arsenal, the Defense Finance and Accounting site was ranked No. 1 in military value of all such sites. Given the low labor costs and room to expand, it would be an ideal location to which to consolidate other sites if it

were given fair and equal consideration. The Commission even questioned the sites chosen by DOD as receiving sites based on higher costs and lower value. Yet, in the end, the Commission chose to rearrange the sites to receive the consolidation and keep open two smaller sites with lower value than Rock Island. At a minimum, the Commission should have voted to keep open the Defense Finance and Accounting Service at the Rock Island Arsenal based on the same fairness consideration as the Civilian Personnel Operations Center. Ideally, it should have chosen the Rock Island Arsenal as a receiving site.

I knew going into this BRAC process that the Rock Island Arsenal could lose jobs. In fact, I am relieved that DOD did not recommend full closure as first contemplated. Moreover, as I testified before the BRAC Commission, if it was determined that an organization would be more efficient and less expensive somewhere else, then I could have lived with that. On this basis, I was even prepared for the BRAC Commission to disagree with my assessment about the proposals for the Rock Island Arsenal that I didn't think made any sense.

However, what I saw in the BRAC Commission's final deliberations took me by surprise. The Commission did not refute the concerns raised by the community. No evidence was produced that the TACOM move made economic sense or would be more efficient. Instead, the staff gave a misleading presentation that gave the impression that the move made economic sense when it did not, based on the data used by the Commission. That doesn't mean I absolve the Commissioners from responsibility in this either. Four of them had seen a presentation by the community and all of them had been contacted by Members of Congress. They had a responsibility to challenge the staff when the staff analysis didn't match what they had heard previously. In this respect, both the BRAC staff and the Commissioners failed in their responsibilities. In the end, what I have seen has caused me to lose confidence in the work of the BRAC Commission. As a result, I cannot endorse their final product.

I ask unanimous consent to have the Rock Island Argus article to which I referred printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SKINNER: ARSENAL DODGED A BULLET

(By Edward Felker)

WASHINGTON—BRAC Commissioner Samuel K. Skinner on Thursday said the Rock Island Arsenal "dodged a major bullet" in the base closing process by losing jobs but not closing completely.

During a brief interview, Mr. Skinner, who visited the Arsenal on behalf of the commission, defended the panel's vote to send 1,129 Quad-Cities jobs to the Detroit Arsenal. The panel approved the move despite protests that the transfer will cost too much and not further Army integration.

Mr. Skinner said that he looked into arguments that the Detroit Arsenal did not have

the space for the incoming workers, but was satisfied that additional construction costs will not hamper expected savings to the taxpayers.

"They said there's still significant payback by doing that," he said of the BRAC staff's review of the move, "and that was the major objection that they had."

He said the commission felt it was only fair to keep open the Arsenal's 251-job Civilian Personnel Office and Civilian Human Resource Agency. It was originally slated to move to Fort Riley, Kan., as part of a sweeping consolidation of defense personnel offices.

But Mr. Skinner urged the panel to delete it because it was targeted as part of a complete closure of the Rock Island Arsenal, and the move was never re-examined after the Pentagon decided to keep the Arsenal open.

"They had no chance to be heard, it wasn't even considered, and on that basis it wasn't fair. So we got a little life," Mr. Skinner said.

He also defended the closure of the Arsenal's 301-job Defense Finance and Accounting Service office. The commission voted to keep other offices open that the Pentagon targeted for closure, but Mr. Skinner said they were on bases of higher military and had the worst economic closure impact among DFAS locations.

He said the overall result for the Arsenal was better than it could have been. "They dodged a major bullet. Not perfect, but it could have been a lot worse."

#### GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2005

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, we are facing times of record spending. Whether it is in the form of relief to the hurricane ravaged gulf coast, financing the war on terrorism, or meeting our obligations to seniors with the Medicare prescription drug benefit, Federal spending is higher now than ever. We have committed ourselves to funding these priorities.

In doing so, I believe we must also look for ways to save in other areas to offset some of these costs. I would liken our current fiscal situation to that of any common American household. When emergencies or unforeseen obligations arise, such as an illness or a major repair, you find a way to pay the bill. But in doing so, you must also look at your household budget and find places to save.

So I come to the Senate floor today to speak a little bit about legislation I recently introduced to require regular review of Federal programs with the goal of identifying areas where savings can be made. S. 1399, the Government Reorganization and Program Performance Improvement Act, will create the necessary mechanisms to require Congress and the executive branch to regularly and formally examine whether Federal programs and agencies are achieving, or have achieved desired results for the American people, and make the necessary adjustments.

The bill would do this through the creation of a sunset commission and individual results commissions. The sunset commission would hold the Federal Government accountable for per-

formance by reviewing and providing recommendations to retain, restructure, or end Federal agencies or programs. Congress and the President would enact a 10-year schedule for the administration to assess the performance of all Federal agencies and programs. Acting on those assessments, the seven-member bipartisan sunset commission, appointed by the President in consultation with Congress, will recommend ways to improve effectiveness and spend taxpayer dollars more wisely.

The commission will provide an important framework to facilitate the reform, restructuring, or possible elimination of those agencies or programs unable to demonstrate expected performance results during their scheduled review. It will also help to identify those programs that have achieved their intended purposes or outlived their usefulness.

A second key feature of this important measure is the creation of individual results commissions targeted at specific programs or policy areas where duplication and overlapping jurisdiction hinder reform. Again, these seven-member bipartisan commissions, appointed by the President in consultation with Congress, will consider administration proposals to improve the performance of various programs and agencies by restructuring and consolidation. This will reduce unnecessary costs and waste paid for by the American taxpayer.

We need to continue to evaluate the way the Federal Government operates and look for ways to make it more cost effective for the long term. I believe this legislation presents a good step toward dealing with the large number of Federal programs out there, many of which are, frankly, wasteful and unnecessary. Many also duplicate other Federal, State and private efforts. S. 1399 provides a commonsense framework for reorganization and review of Federal programs, and provides for a way to abolish them if determined unnecessary.

S. 1399 is a good government measure. It is about efficiency, accountability to the American taxpayer, and identifying potential savings. It is a fiscally responsible measure that will provide a way for the Federal Government to save even as it meets its spending obligations in the future. I invite my colleagues to take a serious look at this proposal and to join me in advancing this effort.

#### AUGUST 2005 CODEL TO LATIN AMERICA

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, from August 14 to the 22, I traveled to Latin America to investigate first hand important issues relating to national security, immigration and the war on drugs. I would like to share the details of this trip and some of the insights I gained with my colleagues.

On Sunday, August 14, we flew to Havana, Cuba. Upon our arrival we drove

to the U.S. Mission where we met with James Cason, our chief of mission, and members of his staff. I started off the meeting by asking my hosts if Cuba could help the U.S. combat the smuggling of illegal drugs into our country. Mr. Rod Rojas of the U.S. Coast Guard, who currently serves as the U.S. Drug Interdiction Specialist based in Havana, noted that there is a good working relationship between the Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard on drug issues. It primarily takes the form of the Cubans sharing information with the United States as to suspicious ships passing through its territorial waters. The United States then interdicts these ships when they cross into U.S. waters. While the number of such reports has fallen in recent years, Mr. Rojas believes that this is a testament to the success of Cuban efforts: now that they know they will be reported, drug smugglers seem to be avoiding Cuban waters.

These reports confirm my long-held view that we should be working more closely with Cuba on drug interdiction efforts. This is why since 2001 I have sought to include language in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill to fund joint drug interdiction efforts between our two countries. This language is in the Senate version of the fiscal year 2006 bill, and I intend to press to secure its retention in the bill through conference.

From this positive report on the drug interdiction situation, our conversation turned to a troubling report on the current human rights situation in Cuba. Mr. Cason told us that there has been a deterioration of human rights in Cuba in recent years as Castro has cracked down on political dissidents. In 2003, Castro jailed 75 dissidents and has thus far released fewer than 20 from this group. These arrests were followed by others including the arrest of over 30 dissidents earlier this year. In addition to arrests, Castro has begun to employ other atrocious practices including having dissidents assaulted on the streets and generating demonstrations at the homes of dissidents to prevent them from stepping outside.

This repression has spread to the economic realm as well. In the late 1990s, Castro had opened a very limited window to free enterprise in Cuba by issuing licenses for private businesses. Had this trend continued, Cuba could have followed the path of China and Vietnam towards a limited market economy and higher living standards. Instead, Castro has abandoned this liberalization and cut back the number of licenses for private business. Both politically and economically, there are signs that Cuba is going backwards.

Finally, our conversation turned to the issue of immigration. In an effort to provide a legal outlet for immigration and avoid the massive boatlifts of the past, the United States allows 20,000 Cubans to legally immigrate every year. This number includes family reunifications, visas given out by